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Abstract. It is challenging for stochastic optimizations to handle large-
scale sensitive data safely. Recently, Duchi et al. proposed private sam-
pling strategy to solve privacy leakage in stochastic optimizations. How-
ever, this strategy leads to robustness degeneration, since this strategy
is equal to the noise injection on each gradient, which adversely af-
fects updates of the primal variable. To address this challenge, we intro-
duce a robust stochastic optimization under the framework of local pri-
vacy, which is called Privacy-pREserving StochasTIc Gradual lEarning
(PRESTIGE). PRESTIGE bridges private updates of the primal vari-
able (by private sampling) with the gradual curriculum learning (CL).
Specifically, the noise injection leads to the issue of label noise, but the
robust learning process of CL can combat with label noise. Thus, PRES-
TIGE yields “private but robust” updates of the primal variable on the
private curriculum, namely an reordered label sequence provided by CL.
In theory, we reveal the convergence rate and maximum complexity of
PRESTIGE. Empirical results on six datasets show that, PRESTIGE
achieves a good tradeoff between privacy preservation and robustness
over baselines.
1 Introduction
Learning from large-scale sensitive data stems from 2004 [1], and still keeps vi-
brant [2,3]. However, the direct use of learning algorithms on such data will
lead to the issues of “computational burden” [4] and “privacy leakage” [5]. Un-
fortunately, large-scale sensitive data are ubiquitous in the real world, such as
electronic health record [6], mobile app information [7,8], and genome-wide as-
sociation database [9,10,11].
Recently, researchers leverage stochastic optimization to handle large-scale
data, because of its low computational cost [4]. First, it does not require to com-
pute the full gradient in each iteration. This merit reduces time costs greatly.
Second, in each iteration, it processes either a single point [12] or a tiny batch
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of points [13]. However, on large-scale sensitive data, the direct use of stochas-
tic optimization is obviously unsafe, which may lead to the issue of “privacy
leakage”.
Specifically, large-scale sensitive data itself (i.e., electronic health record)
carries too much private information (i.e., disease history or diet habit) related
to data providers. Even if we leverage the “safe harbor” method [14,15] to de-
identify 1 these sensitive data before using it, the re-identification is still pos-
sible [6]. Therefore, the output of stochastic optimization will carry implicit
information delivered from large-scale sensitive data. Based on these informa-
tion, hackers can perform reverse engineering, namely reasoning from output to
input, to re-identify data providers and expose their privacy [16,17].
To handle large-scale sensitive data, it is reasonable to propose the privacy-
preserving stochastic optimizations [18] under the global privacy [19,20,21]. Mo-
tivated by the fact that the local privacy is more stringent than the global
privacy [22], Duchi et al. designed a private sampling strategy to preserve the
privacy of stochastic optimizations under local privacy [23]. However, the issue
of “robustness degeneration” arises subsequently, since the technique of private
sampling is essentially equal to the noise injection on each gradient, which ad-
versely affects updates of the primal variable. This issue is very common for
privacy-preserving algorithms [24,25,26,27,11].
To address this challenge, we introduce a robust stochastic optimization un-
der the framework of local privacy [28], which is called Privacy-pREserving
StochasTIc Gradual lEarning (PRESTIGE). PRESTIGE naturally bridges pri-
vate updates of the primal variable (by private sampling) with the gradual learn-
ing process of curriculum learning (CL) [29]. Our inspiration springs from the
learning process of CL, namely learning from “easy” tasks to “complex” tasks,
which is often used for training robust models [29,30]. Specifically, the noise in-
jection leads to the issue of label noise, but the robust learning process of CL
can combat with label noise [31,32]. Therefore, PRESTIGE achieves “private
but robust” updates of the primal variable on the private curriculum, which is
an reordered label sequence provided by CL from beneficial labels to adverse
labels 2. To sum up, in the first epoch, PRESTIGE ensures the update of the
primal variable on beneficial labels, which creates a robust model from the out-
set. In subsequent epochs, updates of the primal variable occur on adverse labels
gradually until convergence. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
1. We introduce a “private but robust” stochastic optimization called PRES-
TIGE. This is the first work to solve robustness degeneration in privacy-
preserving stochastic optimizations by curriculum learning.
2. We define the private curriculum to realize PRESIGE, and reveal the conver-
gence rate and the maximum complexity (KWIK bound [33]) of PRESTIGE.
1 The de-identification involves removing many identifiers, such as names, dates, gen-
ders, drive license and social security numbers.
2 Beneficial label is sufficiently reliable for the update of the primal variable correctly.
Meanwhile, adverse label is unreliable or even noisy for the update of the primal
variable correctly.
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3. We conduct comprehensive experiments on UCI and real-world sensitive
datasets. Empirical results show that PRESTIGE achieves a good tradeoff
between privacy preservation and robustness over other baselines.
2 Related Work
Our study deals with privacy-preserving online/stochastic optimizations for large-
scale sensitive data. For example, Jain et al. proposed the differentially-private
online learning [34]. Song et al. proposed the private stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) by the gradient perturbation, and improved this work with the mini-
batch trick [18]. Wu et al. bridged differentially-private SGD with a practical
RDBMS system [35]. Nevertheless, all their works are based on global differen-
tial privacy [36]. Since local differential privacy is more stringent than global
differential privacy, Duchi et al. proposed a private SGD under local privacy
[23]. However, their method does not consider “robustness degeneration”. Our
PRESTIGE aims to address “privacy leakage” and “robustness degeneration”
simultaneously under local privacy.
Our work is also related to curriculum learning (CL) and self-paced learning.
Bengio et al. provided a learning paradigm called curriculum learning [29], and
Kumar et al. presented the similar learning regime named self-paced learning
[30]. The idea shared by these two studies is to learn easier tasks first, and
gradually learn more difficult tasks to result in a robust model. However, CL has
never been applied into any privacy-preserving algorithms due to two challenges.
First, CL is a high-level idea without the specific formalization, it is still unknown
how to realize the private CL algorithms under privacy constraints. Moreover,
existing CL algorithms do not have any formal termination criteria, which needs
more iterations to converge. PRESTIGE can be viewed as the first work to realize
the private CL under local privacy.
Therefore, in the following paper, we try to address three important ques-
tions: 1) why curriculum learning can solve the issue of robustness degeneration?
2) how to design the private curriculum to realize PRESTIGE? 3) how to provide
theoretical guarantees for PRESTIGE?
3 PRESTIGE
In this section, we begin with preliminary notations and definitions. Then, we
briefly present why “robustness degeneration” will happen, and how to overcome
this nontrivial issue by “private curriculum”. Lastly, we provide the theoretical
analysis.
3.1 Preliminary Notations and Definitions
Throughout the paper, let D = {xi, yi}ni=1 be the training data, where xi ∈ Rd
denotes the ith instance and yi ∈ {−1,+1} denotes its binary label. A typical
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classification model is represented as:
min
w
F (w) = min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
fi(w), (1)
where w ∈ Bd(R) is the primal variable. Bd(R) denotes the d dimensional Eu-
clidean ball of radius R. Specifically, fi(w) = ρλ(w) + r(w; {xi, yi}) where λ is
the regularization parameter, ρλ(w) is the regularizer, and r(w; {xi, yi}) is a loss
function. Note that, robustness can be evaluated by the accuracy of classification
model.
Intuitively, the -differentially globally private algorithm preserves the pri-
vacy on the level of the whole dataset (Definition 1). However, the -differentially
locally private algorithm preserves the privacy on the level of each instance (Def-
inition 2). Therefore, local privacy is more stringent than the global privacy [22].
Definition 1. (Global Privacy, Definition 2 in [37]). For a privacy parameter
 ≥ 0, a algorithm M is -differentially globally private, if
Pr(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ exp() Pr(M(X′) ∈ S), (2)
for all measurable subsets S of the range of M, and for all datasets X, X′
differing by a single entry (their Hamming distance equals to 1).
Definition 2. (Local Privacy, Definition 1 in [38]) For a privacy parameter
 ≥ 0, a algorithm M is -differentially locally private, if
sup
S∈σ(Z)
sup
x,x′∈X
Pr(zi ∈ S|xi = x)
Pr(zi ∈ S|xi = x′) ≤ exp(), (3)
where zi =M(xi) for ∀i. Namely, the output {zi}ni=1 is an -differentially locally
private view of input {xi}ni=1. σ(Z) denotes an appropriate σ-field on Z.
3.2 Challenge
Proposition 1. (Private Sampling for Stochastic Gradient) Given a stochastic
gradient vector g with ‖g‖2 ≤ L, where L is Lipschitz parameter, rescale g into
g˜ = L g‖g‖2 with probability
1
2 +
‖g‖2
2L and g˜ = −L g‖g‖2 with probability 12 −
‖g‖2
2L .
After sampling Q ∼ Bernoulli(piεs = e
εs
eεs+1), we sample Gp (privatized stochastic
gradient vector) as follows:
Gp ∼
{
Unif(〈gp, g˜〉 > 0), Q = 1
Unif(〈gp, g˜〉 ≤ 0), Q = 0 , (4)
where gp ∈ Rd and ‖gp‖2 = B.
Proof. Here, we prove whether private sampling belongs to the non-interactive
strategy of εs-local differential privacy. Note that, we leverage Figure 1 to assist
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Gp
g Top
Bottom
Fig. 1. Private sampling perturbs and rescales gradient g into Gp, which equals to
noise  injection.
our proof. By the first principle, we should start from the adaptive definition of
εs-local differential privacy, and we employ the non-interactive strategy:
sup
R
sup
r,r′
Pr(GP ∈ R|g ∈ r)
Pr(GP ∈ R|g ∈ r′) ≤ e
εs . (5)
Note that, R, r, r′ represents the “Top” or “Bottom” area (“Top” or “Bottom”
is abbreviated as “T” or “B”), where Gp or g locates. Therefore, this proof can
be conducted from four cases as follows: 1) Pr(GP∈T|g∈T)Pr(GP∈T|g∈B) ; 2)
Pr(GP∈B|g∈B)
Pr(GP∈B|g∈T) ; 3)
Pr(GP∈T|g∈B)
Pr(GP∈T|g∈T) ; 4)
Pr(GP∈B|g∈T)
Pr(GP∈B|g∈B) . Assume that
‖g‖2
2L = k, due ‖g‖2 ≤ L, we have
k ≤ 0.5.
If g ∈ T, then Pr(g˜ ∈ T|g ∈ T) = 0.5 + ‖g‖22L , meanwhile, if g˜ ∈ T, then
Pr(Gp ∈ T|g˜ ∈ T) = eεseεs+1 . However, if g ∈ T, then Pr(g˜ ∈ B|g ∈ T) = 0.5− ‖g‖22L ,
meanwhile, if g˜ ∈ B, then Pr(Gp ∈ T|g˜ ∈ B) = 1eεs+1 . According to the chain
rule, we have Pr(Gp ∈ T|g ∈ T) = (0.5 + k) eεseεs+1 + (0.5− k) 1eεs+1 .
If g ∈ B, then Pr(g˜ ∈ T|g ∈ B) = 0.5 − ‖g‖22L , meanwhile, if g˜ ∈ T, then
Pr(Gp ∈ T|g˜ ∈ T) = eεseεs+1 . However, if g ∈ B, then Pr(g˜ ∈ B|g ∈ B) = 0.5+ ‖g‖22L ,
meanwhile, if g˜ ∈ B, then Pr(Gp ∈ T|g˜ ∈ B) = 1eεs+1 . According to the chain
rule, we have Pr(Gp ∈ T|g ∈ B) = (0.5− k) eεseεs+1 + (0.5 + k) 1eεs+1 .
Therefore, we have:
sup sup
Pr(Gp ∈ T|g ∈ T)
Pr(Gp ∈ T|g ∈ B)
=
0.5 + e
εs−1
eεs+1k
0.5 + 1−eεseεs+1k
≤ 0.5 +
eεs−1
eεs+10.5
0.5 + 1−eεseεs+10.5
=
1 + e
εs−1
eεs+1
1 + 1−eεseεs+1
= eεs .
(6)
Therefore, the first case has been proved. By symmetry, we prove the second
case in the following.
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If g ∈ B, then Pr(g˜ ∈ T|g ∈ B) = 0.5 − ‖g‖22L , meanwhile, if g˜ ∈ T, then
Pr(Gp ∈ B|g˜ ∈ T) = 1eεs+1 . However, if g ∈ B, then Pr(g˜ ∈ B|g ∈ B) = 0.5+ ‖g‖22L ,
meanwhile, if g˜ ∈ B, then Pr(Gp ∈ B|g˜ ∈ B) = eεseεs+1 . According to the chain
rule, we have Pr(Gp ∈ B|g ∈ B) = (0.5− k) 1eεs+1 + (0.5 + k) e
εs
eεs+1 .
If g ∈ T, then Pr(g˜ ∈ T|g ∈ T) = 0.5 + ‖g‖22L , meanwhile, if g˜ ∈ T, then
Pr(Gp ∈ B|g˜ ∈ T) = 1eεs+1 . However, if g ∈ T, then Pr(g˜ ∈ B|g ∈ T) = 0.5− ‖g‖22L ,
meanwhile, if g˜ ∈ B, then Pr(Gp ∈ B|g˜ ∈ B) = eεseεs+1 . According to the chain
rule, we have Pr(Gp ∈ B|g ∈ T) = (0.5 + k) 1eεs+1 + (0.5− k) e
εs
eεs+1 .
Therefore, we have:
sup sup
Pr(Gp ∈ B|g ∈ B)
Pr(Gp ∈ B|g ∈ T)
=
0.5 + e
εs−1
eεs+1k
0.5 + 1−eεseεs+1k
≤ 0.5 +
eεs−1
eεs+10.5
0.5 + 1−eεseεs+10.5
=
1 + e
εs−1
eεs+1
1 + 1−eεseεs+1
= eεs .
(7)
Thus, the second case has been proved. Furthermore, according to the above
analysis and Eq. (6) and (7), we can easily prove the case 3 and case 4, namely:
sup sup
Pr(Gp ∈ T|g ∈ B)
Pr(Gp ∈ T|g ∈ T) =
1 + 1−e
εs
eεs+1
1 + e
εs−1
eεs+1
=
1
eεs
≤ eεs . (8)
sup sup
Pr(Gp ∈ B|g ∈ T)
Pr(Gp ∈ B|g ∈ B) =
1 + 1−e
εs
eεs+1
1 + e
εs−1
eεs+1
=
1
eεs
≤ eεs . (9)
Then the proof completes. To sum up, we prove that private sampling for
stochastic gradient belongs to the non-interactive strategy of εs-local differential
privacy.
Recently, Duchi et al. invented a novel strategy called private sampling [23],
which imposes stringent local privacy for any d-dimensional mean-estimation
problem [39]. Therefore, this strategy can be easily adopted into stochastic gradi-
ent to preserve the privacy of stochastic optimizations (Proposition 1). However,
this strategy inevitably leads to “robustness degeneration”, since this strategy
is equal to the noise injection on each gradient (Figure 1), which adversely af-
fects updates of the primal variable w. Moreover, its unrestricted noise injection
may lead to the slow convergence or even the divergence [23]. Thus, these issues
motivate us to explore a mechanism to ensure “private but robust” updates of
the primal variable w with the convergence.
3.3 Solution
Main Idea Our idea is motivated by curriculum learning (CL), which learns
easier tasks first, and learns more difficult tasks gradually to ensure a robust
model. This strategy resembles training an infant through to adulthood. Namely,
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Table 1. Comparison of different approaches. DJW denotes Duchi-Jordan-
Wainwright’s approach using private sampling [23].
Methods Iterative Training Local Privacy Learning Process
SGD Gradient-based No Random
DJW Gradient-based Yes Random
CL Heuristic No “Easy” to “Complex”
PRESTIGE Gradient-based Yes “Beneficial” to “Adverse”
Beneficial Adverse
1st
2nd
kth
:
...
...
...
Fig. 2. PRESTIGE yields robust updates of the primal variable w on an reordered label
sequence, namely from beneficial labels (light block) to adverse labels (dark block). The
darker block denotes the curriculum with more adverse labels, and vice versa. In each
iteration, arrows specify the feasible areas for updates of the primal variable w.
knowledge is ordered to allow for gradual learning. Infants are provided with
easy knowledge first. As they grow and are able to handle more complex con-
cepts, more difficult knowledge is provided. Based on the above inspiration,
we introduce a “private but robust” stochastic optimization called “Privacy-
pREserving StochasTIc Gradual lEarning” (PRESTIGE) for large-scale sensi-
tive data. PRESTIGE incorporates private updates of the primal variable w (by
private sampling) with the gradual learning of CL.
Specifically, the noise injection leads to the issue of label noise [40]. Mean-
while, CL provides the ordered learning to learn from easy tasks first then to
hard tasks until convergence, which can combat with label noise [31]. Therefore,
through the robust learning paradigm of CL, PRESTIGE aims to yield “private
but robust” updates of the primal variable w on the curriculum (Definition 3),
which is an reordered label sequence from “beneficial” labels to “adverse” labels
(Figure 2). Table 1 shows the key comparison of different learning approaches,
and PRESTIGE integrates all benefits simultaneously. Noted that, CL is only a
high-level idea without any specific formalization. We illustrate our PRESTIGE
using a label noise setting as follows.
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+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
-1
-1
-1
-1
Beneficial 
Label
Adverse 
Label
Adverse 
Label
A
D
C
B
B
Beneficial RegionAdverse Region
+∞-∞
Z
hyperplane
+
-
D C 0 A
Fig. 3. Top Panel: Circles denote real positive instances such as “A” and “D”. Squares
represent real negative instances such as “B” and “C”; however, both “B” and “C” are
erroneously viewed as positive class, and “D” is erroneously viewed as negative class.
This creates three adverse labels. According to their distance to the hyperplane, the
label of “A” is beneficial; while the labels of “B”, “C” and “D” are adverse. Bottom
Panel: “A” is located in the beneficial region defined by z ≥ 0; while “B”, “C” and
“D” are located in the adverse region defined by z ≤ 0.
Illustrated Example Given that private sampling adversely affects the update
of current w (hyperplane). In the top panel of Figure 3, instance xA (i.e., data
point “A”) should be with label yA = +1, which corresponds to its predicted
label value (+1) (predicted label value =
{
+1 Cw(x) ≥ 0
−1 Cw(x) < 0 , where Cw denotes
the current classifier). Therefore, the label yA of instance xA can be regarded as
a “beneficial” label. Namely, beneficial label is sufficiently reliable for the update
of the primal variable correctly. Conversely, instances xB , xC and xD (i.e., data
points “B”, “C” and “D”) should be with labels yB = −1, yC = −1, yD = +1.
These labels are the opposite of their predicted label value. Therefore, the label
yB of instance xB , the label yC of instance xC and the label yD of instance xD
can be regarded as “adverse” labels. Namely, adverse label is unreliable or even
noisy for the update of the primal variable correctly. Among them, “B” is farther
than “C” and “D” to the hyperplane, which means that “B” is more unreliable.
More importantly, these labels would negatively affect the update of the primal
variable. To remedy this negative effect, PRESTIGE attempts to leverage the
robust learning regime of CL. First, we define the curriculum of PRESTIGE.
Definition 3. (Curriculum). For training data D = {xi, yi}ni=1, if Cw denotes
the current classifier, then the curriculum z in PRESTIGE can be calculated
as the product of the label y and the predicted label of an instance x, namely
z = yCw(x).
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Remark 1. In PRESTIGE, zi > zj represents that xi is more reliable than xj ,
which further means that xi should be learned earlier than xj . In conclusion,
PRESTIGE learns from “beneficial” labels to “adverse” labels.
According to Definition 3, given beneficial data {xA, yA}, adverse data {xB , yB},
{xC , yC} and {xD, yD} in the top panel of Figure 3, we have the curriculum
zA = yACw(xA) > 0, the curriculums zB = yBCw(xB) < zD = yDCw(xD) <
zC = yCCw(xC) < 0. Therefore, in the bottom panel of Figure 3, the curriculum
z = 0 can be employed to separate the axis into the beneficial region (z ≥ 0)
and the adverse region (z ≤ 0) respectively. Furthermore, the update region for
PRESTIGE (z ≥ Dth) is controlled by a dynamic threshold Dth. Note that, Dth
should be initialized larger than 1 in the axis and the curriculum z ≥ Dth. Thus,
the curriculum z > 1 includes beneficial labels by the max-margin principle [41].
Through the robust learning process of CL, in the initial epoch, the update of
the primal variable w is limited to “beneficial” labels (z ≥ Dth > 1) to estab-
lish a robust model. In the following epochs, we gradually reduce the dynamic
threshold Dth. Correspondingly, updates occur from “beneficial” to “adverse”
labels incrementally until convergence.
Design of Private Curriculum The former example explains how PRES-
TIGE yields robust updates of the primal variable w on the curriculum provided
by CL. However, this curriculum may break the constraint of local privacy, which
motivates us to propose the private curriculum (Definition 4) for PRESTIGE.
Reasons are explained in Remark of Definition 4. Note that, Proposition 2 serves
for Definition 4.
Proposition 2. Given the design matrix Pc of Warner’s model [22]. If random-
ized response is leveraged to preserve εr-differentially local privacy, the design
matrix Pc should be:
Pc =
(
eεr
eεr+1
1
eεr+1
1
eεr+1
eεr
eεr+1
)
. (10)
Remark 2. We acquire noise rates (ρ+, ρ−) from the design matrix Pc directly,
and ρ+ = ρ− = 1eεr+1 , where ρ+ = Pr(y˜ = −1|y = +1) and ρ− = Pr(y˜ = +1|y = −1).
Namely, we perturb the original y to form y˜ by noise rates (ρ+, ρ−).
Proof. According to the definition of design matrix Pc, p+1,−1 = ρ+ = Pr(y˜ = −1|y = +1),
p−1,+1 = ρ− = Pr(y˜ = +1|y = −1), p+1,+1 = Pr(y˜ = +1|y = +1) and p−1,−1 =
Pr(y˜ = −1|y = −1). Assume that p+1,+1p+1,−1 = a and
p−1,−1
p−1,+1
= b. To meet εr-
differentially local privacy, we have a ≤ eεr and b ≤ eεr . Here, we assume that
randomized response still prefers the true value, namely p+1,+1, p−1,−1 > 0.5.
Therefore, 1 < a ≤ eεr and 1 < b ≤ eεr . Since randomized response prefers the
true value, we also hope to maximize p+1,+1 + p−1,−1, which equally maximizes
2a
a+1 by Warner’s model (a = b). Due to
∂( 2aa+1 )
∂a =
2
(a+1)2 > 0,
2a
a+1 is monotoni-
cally increasing in the feasible area (1, eεr ]. Therefore, we set a = eεr to achieve
its maximum value, and the design matrix Pc is Eq. (10).
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Definition 4. (Private Curriculum). For training data D = {xi, yi}ni=1, if Cw
denotes the current classifier, then the private curriculum z in PRESTIGE can
be calculated as the product of the perturbed label y˜ and the predicted label of
an instance x, where y˜ is perturbed from y according to Proposition 2. Namely,
z = y˜Cw(x), where y˜ is perturbed from y by noise rates ρ+ = ρ− = 1eεr+1 .
Remark 3. In Algorithm 1, we use private curriculum (Definition 4) instead of
curriculum (Definition 3). The reason is, without of label perturbation in Def-
inition 4, when the curriculum of sample {xit, yit} locates without the current
update region, namely zit(w
(tmp)) < Dth, the algorithm itself will leak the in-
formation that this sample is adverse. This issue breaks the basic definition of
local privacy.
Algorithm 1 PRESTIGE: Privacy-pREserving StochasTIc Gradual
lEarning
Input: λ ≥ 0, b, the max number of epochs Tmax, the step size µ, the loss function
r(w; {xi, yi}), the regularizer ρλ(w) = λ2 ‖w‖2, the training set D = {xi, yi}ni=1,
two local privacy parameters εr, εs ≤ 1 where ε = εr + εs, the Lipschitz
parameter L and the scalar bound B ∈ R+.
Initialize: t = 0, w˜(0) randomly, the dynamic threshold Dth > 1 by the max-margin
principle (i.e., Dth = 1.5), the initial value of dynamic learning rate η0 =
R
B
.
for T = 1, 2, . . . , Tmax do
Assign: w(tmp) = w˜(T−1).
Shuffle: n training instances in D.
for k = 1, . . . , n do
Sequentially pick: {xit, yit} from D, it ∈ {1, ..., n}.
P-Curriculum: zit(w
(tmp), εr) = (〈w(tmp),xit〉+ b)y˜it, where y˜it from yit by
noise rates ρ+ = ρ− = 1eεr+1 .
If zit(w
(tmp), εr) ≥ Dth:
Update: t = t+ 1 and η = η0
λ
√
t
= R
λB
√
t
.
Compute: g = λw(tmp) + ∂wr(w
(tmp); {xit, y˜it}).
Rescale: g˜ =
{
L g‖g‖2 , 0.5 +
‖g‖2
2L
−L g‖g‖2 , 0.5−
‖g‖2
2L
.
Sample: Q ∼ Bernoulli( eεs
eεs+1
).
Sample: Gp ∼
{
Unif(〈gp, g˜〉 > 0), Q = 1
Unif(〈gp, g˜〉 ≤ 0), Q = 0 , where gp ∈ R
d and ‖gp‖2 = B.
P-Update: w(new) = w(tmp) − ηGp.
Assign: w(tmp) = w(new).
end
Assign: w˜(T ) = w(tmp).
Update: Dth = Dth − µ
√
T .
end
Output: w˜(Tmax).
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Algorithm Realization We realize details of PRESTIGE in Algorithm 1,
which consists of two key components: private curriculum (p-curriculum) calcu-
lation and judgement (line 8−9 and 10) and private update (p-update, line 17).
PRESTIGE preserves a composite privacy: p-curriculum privacy with parameter
εr (line 9) and in-curriculum privacy with parameter εs (line 14) sequentially.
Specifically, 1) PRESTIGE compute p-curriculum zit(w
(tmp), εr) (Definition 4)
to preserve p-curriculum privacy, which is essentially based on randomized re-
sponse [42]. 2) PRESTIGE conducts private sampling in line 11−16 to preserve
in-curriculum privacy, where we follow Duchi et al. [23]. 3) With the decrease of
Dth (line 20), PRESTIGE updates its primal variable from “beneficial” samples
to “adverse” samples privately and robustly.
There is a point to be mentioned in Algorithm 1. The private curriculum
zit(w
(tmp), εr) is realized by the linear mapping function Cw in line 8. It means
that we apply PRESTIGE to linear classification (i.e., SVM) model. Note that,
both linear and nonlinear classification models are under the same empirical risk
minimization (ERM) principle (Eq. (1)). Thus, the PRESTIGE mechanism can
be readily leveraged by nonlinear classification model as well, if we represent Cw
by deep neural networks.
Composite Privacy PRESTIGE preserves a composite privacy, using private
curriculum and private sampling together. According to composition theorem in
Lemma 1, if ε = εr + εs, PRESTIGE keeps ε-differentially local privacy.
Lemma 1. (Theorem 3.14 in [43]). Let M1 be an ε1 differentially private algo-
rithm, and letM2 be an ε2 differentially private algorithm. Then their sequential
combination, defined to be M1,2, is (ε1 + ε2)-differentially private.
3.4 Theoretical Analysis
Theorem 1 reveals the convergence rate of PRESTIGE, which is similar to
O( 1√
T
). To obtain a sharper/faster convergence rate, we propose Corollary 1.
Theorem 2 explores the maximum complexity of PRESTIGE, which provides
the formal termination criteria for early stopping. All theorems hold for the
choice of any regularizer.
Convergence Rate We analyze the convergence rate of PRESTIGE, which
demonstrates that our algorithm can converge. We use E
[ · ] to denote the
expectation. Before delving into Theorem 1, we first present a fundamental
lemma below.
Lemma 2. If we leverage the Proposition 1 in Section 3.2, namely, we privatize
the random variable X ∈ Rd into the variable Z ∈ Rd by private sampling, then
to achieve the unbiasedness condition E[Z|X] = X, the scalar bound B should
be set as:
B = L
√
pi
eεs + 1
eεs − 1
dΓ (d−12 + 1)
Γ (d2 + 1)
, (11)
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where ‖X‖2 ≤ L and εs is privacy parameter of private sampling.
Proof. We privatize the random variable X ∈ Rd into the variable Z ∈ Rd by
private sampling with privacy parameter εs. Moreover, we assume that X ∈ Rd
with the constraint of ‖X‖2 ≤ L. Since the private sampling is highly related to
d-dimensional ball, therefore, we first explore the surface area of d-dimensional
ball. According to the constraint, the radius of this ball should be L. Thus,
the surface area (denoted as SA) of d-dimensional ball with the radius L is
SAd(L) =
dLd−1pi
d
2
Γ ( d2+1)
. Note that, for simplicity, we first set L = 1 to derive a
simple result, and then generalize this result with arbitrary L. If we sample a
random variable V uniformly on the surface of this ball with L = 1, and assume
the first coordinate V1 = e1, then we have:
E[V ] =
2e1
SAd(1)
∫ 1
0
SAd−1(
√
1− k2)kdk, (12)
where we leverage the symmetry of d-dimensional ball. To integrate the Eq. (12)
easier, we switch from cartesian coordinate system to polar coordinate system.
Namely:
E[V ] =
2e1
SAd(1)
∫ 1
0
SAd−1(
√
1− k2)kdk
= e1
2SAd−1(1)
SAd(1)
∫ pi
2
0
cosd−2(θ) sin(θ)dθ
= e1
2SAd−1(1)
SAd(1)
∫ pi
2
0
(−
d
dθ cos
d−1(θ)
d− 1 )dθ
= e1
2SAd−1(1)
SAd(1)
1
d− 1
= e12
Γ (d2 + 1)
dpi
d
2
(d− 1)pi d−12
Γ (d−12 + 1)
1
d− 1
= e12
Γ (d2 + 1)
d
√
piΓ (d−12 + 1)
.
(13)
Note that, the procedure of locally-private sampling is uniformly processed on
the half of d-dimensional ball. Due to ‖E[Z]‖2 = B and ‖X‖2 = L, therefore, we
generalize E[Z|X] from coefficients of E[V ] by leveraging the rotational symme-
try and different sampling probability:
E[Z|X] = X‖X‖2B
Γ (d2 + 1)
d
√
piΓ (d−12 + 1)
(
eεs
eεs + 1
− 1
eεs + 1
). (14)
Therefore, to achieve the unbiasedness condition E[Z|X] = X, we have:
B
L
Γ (d2 + 1)
d
√
piΓ (d−12 + 1)
(
eεs
eεs + 1
− 1
eεs + 1
) = 1. (15)
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Namely, we have:
B = L
√
pi
eεs + 1
eεs − 1
dΓ (d−12 + 1)
Γ (d2 + 1)
. (16)
Then the proof completes.
Theorem 1. For PRESTIGE, consider that any w ∈ Bd(R) and the loss is
L-Lipschitz with respect to the lp-norm for some p ∈ [2,∞]. At t-th iteration
after randomized response, let Gpt be generated from stochastic gradient gt ∈ Rd
by private sampling with privacy parameter εs, and Gpt be restricted under the
scalar bound B = L
√
pi e
εs+1
eεs−1
dΓ ( d−12 +1)
Γ ( d2+1)
(Lemma 2). Assume that w∗ is defined as
a local minimum, and the dynamic learning rate ηt is monotonically decreasing
with ηt =
η0
λ
√
t
, where η0 =
R
B . Then, after T actual updates, the convergence
rate of PRESTIGE in expectation is
E
[
F (wˆ(T ))
]− F (w∗) ≤ c(εs, λ)k(d)√
T
,
where F () denotes the classification model (Eq. (1)), wˆ(T ) = 1T
∑T
t=1 w
(t),
c(εs, λ) =
(λ2+2)(eεs+1)
2λεs
is a dynamic function related to privacy level εs and
regularization intensity λ, and k(d) = LR
√
pi
√
d is a constant dependent of di-
mension d.
Remark 4. We conclude that when T = c
2(εs,λ)k
2(d)
2 , PRESTIGE has -solution
3.
Moreover, the convergence rate of PRESTIGE is O(λeεs
√
d
εs
√
T
), which is highly re-
lated to the regularization intensity λ, privacy parameter εs and dimension d.
Note that, the convergence rate of PRESTIGE can be further sped up with Nes-
terovs accelerated strategy [44,45], which will be discussed in our future work.
Proof. According to the update rule of PRESTIGE, w(t+1) = w(t)−ηtGpt , where
Gpt is generated from gt = ∇fit(w(t)) by private sampling, and t is the current
number of actual updates varying from 1 · · ·T . The random number it belongs to
the set {1, ..., n} while zit(w(t−1)) ≥ Dth. Since Gpt is restricted under the bound
B = L
√
pi e
εs+1
eεs−1
dΓ ( d−12 +1)
Γ ( d2+1)
, therefore, we have E[Gpt |gt] = gt. Assume the number
of training sample n is very large, due to (1), |E[∇fit(w(t))] − ∇F (w(t))| ≤ .
With the increase of actual updates, the decrease of dynamic threshold Dth
makes  monotonically decrease towards 0. Thus, we construct the following
inequality:
1
2
‖w(t+1) −w∗‖22
≤ 1
2
‖w(t) −w∗‖22 +
ηt
2
2
‖Gpt‖22 − ηt〈Gpt ,w(t) −w∗〉.
(17)
3 Please refer to the page 47/315 in KDD15 tutorial: https://homepage.cs.uiowa.
edu/~tyng/kdd15-tutorial.pdf for a good visualization of .
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Due to the characteristic of first-order convexity, we have:
〈∇F (w(t)),w(t) −w∗〉 ≥ F (w(t))− F (w∗). (18)
If we multiply −ηt to both hand side of Eq. (18), we have:
− ηt〈∇F (w(t)),w(t) −w∗〉 ≤ −ηt(F (w(t))− F (w∗)). (19)
Therefore, Eq. (17) can be further calculated as below when we define t =
Gpt −∇F (w(t)):
1
2
‖w(t+1) −w∗‖22
≤ 1
2
‖w(t) −w∗‖22 +
ηt
2
2
‖Gpt‖22 − ηt(F (w(t))− F (w∗))
− ηt〈t,w(t) −w∗〉.
(20)
If we exchange items of Eq. (20), namely, 12‖w(t+1)−w∗‖22 and ηt(F (w(t))−
F (w∗)) we have:
F (w(t))− F (w∗)
≤ 1
2ηt
(‖w(t) −w∗‖22 − ‖w(t+1) −w∗‖22) +
ηt
2
‖Gpt‖22
− 〈t,w(t) −w∗〉.
(21)
If we sum up the both hand side of Eq. (21) from 1 · · ·T , then we have:
T∑
t=1
[
F (w(t))− F (w∗)]
≤
T∑
t=1
{ 1
2ηt
(‖w(t) −w∗‖22 − ‖w(t+1) −w∗‖22)}
+
1
2
T∑
t=1
ηt‖Gpt‖22 −
T∑
t=1
〈t,w(t) −w∗〉.
(22)
Note that, since ηt is monotonically decreasing, namely ηt ≥ ηt+1, then we
have 1η1 ≤ · · · ≤ 1ηT . Based on this result, we arrange:
T∑
t=1
{ 1
2ηt
(‖w(t) −w∗‖22 − ‖w(t+1) −w∗‖22)}
≤ 1
2ηT
‖w(1) −w∗‖22 ≤
1
2ηT
‖w(1)‖22 ≤
1
2ηT
R2.
(23)
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Based on Eq. (23), we transform Eq. (22) into:
T∑
t=1
[
F (w(t))− F (w∗)]
≤ 1
2ηT
R2 +
1
2
T∑
t=1
ηt‖Gpt‖22 −
T∑
t=1
〈t,w(t) −w∗〉.
(24)
Due to the strategy of local privacy preservation, we have ‖Gpt‖22 = B. Then,
we take expectation for Eq. (24):
E{
T∑
t=1
[F (w(t))− F (w∗)]} ≤ 1
2ηT
R2 +
1
2
T∑
t=1
ηtB
2, (25)
where E[
∑T
t=1〈t,w(t) −w∗〉] = 0 because the following derivations:
E[〈t,w(t) −w∗〉] = E[〈gt −∇F (w(t)),w(t) −w∗〉] = 0. (26)
If we set ηt =
η0
λ
√
t
= R
λB
√
t
to make sure that ηt is monotonically decreasing,
we have
E{ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[F (w(t))− F (w∗)]} ≤ 1
2T R
λB
√
T
R2 +
B2
2T
R
λB
T∑
t=1
1√
t
. (27)
Due to the following golden rule:
T∑
t=1
1√
t
≤
∫ T
0
x−
1
2 dx = 2
√
T . (28)
Now Eq. (27) can be transformed into:
E[F (wˆ(T ))− F (w∗)] ≤ λRB
2
√
T
+
RB
λ
√
T
=
λ2 + 2
2λ
RB√
T
. (29)
According to Appendix F.2 in [39], to achieve E[Gpt |gt] = gt, we should set
B = L
√
pi e
εs+1
eεs−1
dΓ ( d−12 +1)
Γ ( d2+1)
. Since
dΓ ( d−12 +1)
Γ ( d2+1)
≤ √d and eεs − 1 = εs + O(ε2s)
(Taylor series of exponential function), we have:
B = L
√
pi
eεs + 1
eεs − 1
dΓ (d−12 + 1)
Γ (d2 + 1)
≤ L√pi e
εs + 1
εs
√
d =
√
d
εs
(eεs + 1)L
√
pi.
(30)
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Therefore, we have:
E[F (wˆ(T ))− F (w∗)]
≤ λ
2 + 2
2λ
RB√
T
≤ λ
2 + 2
2λ
R√
T
√
d
εs
(eεs + 1)L
√
pi
=
(λ2 + 2)(eεs + 1)
2λεs
LR
√
pi
√
d√
T
=
c(εs, λ)k(d)√
T
.
(31)
where c(εs, λ) =
(λ2+2)(eεs+1)
2λεs
is a dynamic function related to privacy level εs
and regularization intensity λ, and k(d) = LR
√
pi
√
d is a constant dependent of
d dimension.
Corollary 1. Suppose that q conjugates to p and satisfies that 1p +
1
q = 1. If we
restrict w ∈ Bd(Rd 12− 1q ), due to p ∈ [2,∞], then we have ‖w‖2 ≤ Rd 12− 1q ≤ R.
Therefore, the convergence rate of PRESTIGE in expectation can be sharper as
follows:
E
[
F (wˆ(T ))
]− F (w∗) ≤ c(εs, λ)k′(d)√
T
, (32)
where wˆ(T ) = 1T
∑T
t=1 w
(t), c(εs, λ) =
(λ2+2)(eεs+1)
2λεs
, and k′(d) = LR
√
pid1−
1
q is
a reduced constant, and k′(d) < k(d).
Remark 5. The result of Corollary 1 can be also derived in parallel by Eq. (11)
of [46] coupled with εs-differentially local privacy. Namely, the general minimax
rate for the convergence rate is LR
√
pid
1
2
− 1
q√
T
. The price for εs-differentially local
privacy is a multiplicative factor “c(εs, λ)
√
d”. Therefore, if we combine the result
of general minimax rate with this factor, we can also derive the Corollary 1.
Maximum Complexity To provide the formal termination criteria for early
stopping, we leverage the learning framework of KWIK (knows what it knows)
[33] to explore the maximum complexity (Tmax) of PRESTIGE. KWIK frame-
work combines elements of the well-known Probably Approximately Correct
(PAC) [47] and Mistake-Bound (MB) [48] models. According our observation,
PRESTIGE can be viewed as a curriculum KWIK algorithm. Specifically, in
Algorithm 1, the input of PRESTIGE is D = {xi, yi}ni=1, and the output is the
updated w. Then, PRESTIGE is denoted as the predicted function h in the
hypothesis class H, where H ⊆ (D → w). Before delving into Theorem 2, we
adapt two definitions by KWIK protocol.
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Definition 5. (Accuracy Requirement). Given any updated w ∈ Bd(R). Assume
that w∗ is defined as a local minimum. Therefore, w in the updated area must
be R-accurate, that is, ‖w −w∗‖2 ≤ R whenever z ≥ Dth.
Definition 6. (Sample Complexity Requirement). The virtual complexity of PRES-
TIGE in the infeasible area (z ≤ Dth), is bounded by a function polynomial in
1/R, 1/δ, and dim(H), where dim(H) measures the dimension or complexity of
the hypothesis class H.
Theorem 2. Given the complexity ratio r between maximum and virtual com-
plexity of PRESTIGE, H is efficiently KWIK-learnable if PRESTIGE satisfies
Definition 5 and 6 simultaneously with probability at least 1 − δ (0 < δ < 1).
Then, the maximum complexity of PRESTIGE, Tmax, is polynomial in r, 1/R,
1/δ, and dim(H).
Remark 6. PRESTIGE can be viewed as a curriculum KWIK algorithm with a
KWIK bound O( rR ln 1δ ).
4 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments to verify the robustness of PRESTIGE.
Meanwhile, we also explore the effectiveness of mini-batch PRESTIGE, and the
efficacy of PRESTIGE under different losses.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Table 2. Datasets used in this paper.
DATA SET TRAINING PTS. TESTING PTS. FEATURES.
A7A 16,100 16,461 123
MNIST38 450,000 97,570 784
SUSY 4,000,000 1,000,000 18
REAL-SIM 57,847 14,462 20,985
Cyberbully 100,000 20,000 4,800
Diabetes 17,288 5,327 4,090
Baselines There are three sets of baselines for different purposes. The first set
consists of vanilla SGD and DJW, where DJW denotes Duchi-Jordan-Wainwright’s
model using private sampling [23]. When we compare them with PRESTIGE,
we can verify the robustness of PRESTIGE under the privacy preservation. Note
that, vanilla SGD does not preserve any privacy, and cannot be directly used in
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any sensitive data. However, the performance of vanilla SGD should be better
than that of privacy-preserving stochastic optimizations, as these optimizations
inject the noise more or less. The second category consists of mini-batch SGD
and mini-batch DJW. When we compare them with mini-batch PRESTIGE, we
can further verify the effectiveness of mini-batch trick. The third category con-
sists of vanilla SGD and DJW under different losses (e.g., a) convex and smooth
loss; b) convex and non-smooth loss; c) non-convex and smooth loss; d) non-
convex and non-smooth loss). When we compare them with PRESTIGE under
different losses, we explore which loss benefits the robustness.
Parameters&Metrics For all stochastic methods, the parameter λ is selected
using 10-fold cross validation (CV) in the range of {10−3, · · · , 103}, the maxi-
mum number of epochs Tmax is set to 10 by Theorem 2, and the primal vari-
able w is initialized randomly. To preserve the privacy, we follow the settings
from [18,49], and set the total privacy budget ε× n× Tmax in the range of
{0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6}. For PRESTIGE, we set ε = εr + εs, where εr : εs = 1 : 4.
The step size µ is empirically set to 1. We repeat all experiments 20 times. Then
each plot is averaged across 20 results. Since this paper aims to introduce a pri-
vate but robust version of SGD mechanism, we evaluate its robustness by testing
error rate with standard deviation.
Miscellaneous There are three points to be noted that: (1) In the first and
second sets of baselines, the default loss is the hinge loss. In the third set of
baselines, we choose four different losses: logistic loss (convex and smooth), hinge
loss (convex and non-smooth), Gompertz loss [50] (non-convex and smooth), and
ramp loss [51] (non-convex and non-smooth). For Gompertz loss, the parameter
c∗ is set to 2. For ramp loss, the parameter s∗ is chosen in the range of [−2, 0].
(2) PRESTIGE is to improve the robustness of DJW. According to the idea of
control variable, the fair comparison should be between DJW and the curriculum
version of DJW (PRESTIGE). (3) Experiments are implemented by Python on
a cluster node with a 2.40GHz CPU and 32GB memory.
4.2 Empirical Study
Before delving into empirical results, we first introduce two strands of experimen-
tal datasets. One strand comes from UCI datasets [52], which include small-scale
A7A, middle-scale MNIST38, large-scale SUSY and high-dimensional REAL-
SIM. We use these datasets to verify the proposed PRESTIGE, since these
datasets are representative in the scalability and dimensionality. The other strand
comes from two large-scale sensitive datasets in the real world, namely social
networks [53] and healthcare [6]. As these domains are highly related to individ-
uals in real-world situations, they are very suitable to verify the practicality of
PRESTIGE.
In social networks, we use Cyberbully detection dataset provided by Australia
Research Alliance for Children & Youth (https://www.aracy.org.au/). Cyber-
bully detection dataset is provided by our research collaborator from Australia
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Fig. 4. To verify the robustness of PRESTIGE, we compare PRESTIGE with vanilla
SGD and DJW. We provide the testing error rate with the privacy budget ε on four
UCI datasets: small-scale A7A, middle-scale MNIST38, large-scale SUSY and high-
dimensional REAL-SIM.
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Fig. 5. To verify the robustness of PRESTIGE in real-world situations, we compare
PRESTIGE with vanilla SGD and DJW. We provide the testing error rate with the
privacy budget ε on two real-world datasets: Cyberbully detection (social networks)
and Diabetes prediction (healthcare).
Research Alliance for Chidren & Youth (ARACY). The raw dataset consists of
120, 000 twitter posts. After being preprocessed by skip-thought vectors 4, each
post is represented as a vector with 4, 800 dimension.
In healthcare, we employ Diabetes prediction dataset extracted from Mar-
ketScan Research Databases (https://truvenhealth.com/). Note that, for im-
balanced datasets, the ratio between positive and negative samples is rescaled
around 1 : 1. The statistics for both UCI and real-world datasets are summarized
in Table 2.
Robustness of PRESTIGE To verify the robustness of PRESTIGE, in Fig. 4
and 5, we provide the performance (the testing error rate (TER) with the privacy
budget) comparison among PRESTIGE, vanilla SGD and DJW on four UCI
datasets and two real-world datasets. Inspired by the idea of control variable,
we leverage the same hinge loss to realize PRESTIGE, vanilla SGD and DJW.
We observe that, under the same hinge loss, PRESTIGE obviously achieves
the lower TERs than DJW along the entire x-axis, which demonstrates the ro-
bustness of PRESTIGE. By our analysis, the good results of PRESTIGE should
be due to the mechanism of curriculum learning, which learns a reliable model
from the ordered label sequence. Meanwhile, with the increase of privacy bud-
get, the TERs of both PRESTIGE and DJW decrease continuously. According
to private sampling strategy, e
ε
eε+1 will approach to 1 with the increase of pri-
vacy budget. It means that, with the large probability, Q = 1 and the rotation
angle 〈Gp, g〉 (from gradient g to private gradient Gp) will be restricted under
90◦ due to line 15 − 16 in Algorithm 1. Equivalently, the noise injection will
4 https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/skip_thoughts
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Fig. 6. To verify the effectiveness of mini-batch trick, we compare the mini-batch ver-
sion of PRESTIGE and DJW, where the batch size (listed in the parentheses) is 1, 5
and 10 respectively. We provide the testing error rate and standard deviation with the
privacy budget ε on four UCI datasets.
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Fig. 7. To verify the effectiveness of mini-batch trick in real-world situations, we com-
pare the mini-batch version of PRESTIGE and DJW, where the batch size (listed in
the parentheses) is 1, 5 and 10 respectively. We provide the testing error rate and
standard deviation with the privacy budget ε on two real-world datasets.
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decrease, which lowers the TERs of both methods. Note that, the TERs of both
PRESTIGE and DJW are worse than the TER of vanilla SGD, since all privacy-
preserving algorithms essentially equals to noise injection. However, vanilla SGD
does not preserve any privacy, and cannot be directly used in sensitive data.
Effectiveness of Mini-Batch Trick We further verify the effectiveness of
mini-batch trick on the same datasets, we compare the mini-batch version of
PRESTIGE and DJW, where the batch size is 1, 5 and 10 respectively. We
simultaneously provide the TER and standard deviation (SD) under the privacy
budget. In Fig. 6 and 7, we have three-fold observation with an increase in the
privacy budget. Firstly, the TERs and SDs of mini-batch PRESTIGE and mini-
batch DJW decrease continuously with the increase of privacy budget. Secondly,
under the same method, the larger the batch size is, the lower the TERs and
SDs are. Therefore, it is effective to leverage the mini-batch trick for the better
robustness. Lastly, under the same batch size, PRESTIGE acquires the lower
TERs and SDs than DJW, which again validates the robustness of PRESTIGE.
There are two points to be noted that: 1) it is a common sense that the in-
crease of batch size will decrease the convergence rate of stochastic optimization
[54]. Therefore, we will explore the optimal tradeoff between convergence and
robustness of PRESTIGE in the near future. 2) In Fig. 6 and 7, the advantages
of PRESTIGE in REAL-SIM, Cyberbully and Diabetes are not as significant as
that in other datasets. The reason may be that, the dimension of these datasets
are higher, and the noise injection is more adverse for training robust models.
Thus, it becomes more difficult for curriculum learning to solve the issue of
robust degeneration.
Efficacy of Different Losses Lastly, we verify the efficacy of different losses on
the same datasets. Table 3 presents the testing error rate (TER) and the standard
deviation (SD) under the privacy budget equal to 1. According to the results,
we derive the following conclusions. For DJW, the robustness (TER±SD) of
logistic loss outperforms that of another three losses in most cases, since logistic
loss is convex and smooth, and it can be optimized robustly. For PRESTIGE,
the robustness of Gompertz loss has a marginal advantage over that of logistic
loss. The reason may be that, private curriculum in PRESTIGE introduces some
noisy labels, and Gompertz loss can reduce robustness degeneration caused by
these noisy labels on each update of the primal variable [50]. It is noted that,
for DJW on the high-dimensional REAL-SIM, the robustness of Gompertz loss
surpasses that of logistic loss. We believe that, for high-dimensional datasets, the
robustness is easily degenerated by “noise injection”, which comes from private
sampling. Due to [50], Gompertz loss can reduce robustness degeneration caused
by such noise.
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Table 3. Efficacy of different losses on both UCI and real-world datasets. In each
dataset, results of DJW are in the first row, while results of PRESTIGE are in the
second row.
Dataset Hinge Loss Gompertz Loss Logistic Loss Ramp Loss
A7A 0.1980±0.0019 0.1991±0.0014 0.1892±0.0002 0.2184±0.0229
0.1791±0.0009 0.1732±0.0002 0.1738±0.0002 0.2126±0.0294
MNIST38 0.0953±0.0003 0.1066±0.0001 0.0918±0.0002 0.5005±0.0001
0.0763±0.0002 0.0746±0.0002 0.0796±0.0002 0.4005±0.0001
SUSY 0.3229±0.0005 0.4346±0.0001 0.3199±0.0001 0.4546±0.0002
0.2733±0.0002 0.2731±0.0001 0.3260±0.0055 0.4221±0.0007
REAL-SIM 0.5202±0.0018 0.4839±0.0014 0.5819±0.0007 0.5101±0.0019
0.2148±0.0012 0.2089±0.0015 0.2829±0.0029 0.2095±0.0029
Cyberbully 0.4257±0.0038 0.4322±0.0015 0.4142±0.0001 0.4508±0.0005
0.4202±0.0032 0.3934±0.0011 0.3989±0.0010 0.4459±0.0043
Diabetes 0.3594±0.0060 0.3485±0.0072 0.3464±0.0026 0.3750±0.0033
0.3281±0.0034 0.3125±0.0028 0.3203±0.0082 0.3690±0.0075
5 Conclusions
This paper studies a private but robust SGD mechanism called PRESTIGE for
the large-scale sensitive data, which aims to solve the issues of “privacy leakage”
and “robustness degeneration” simultaneously. In future, we will further explore
three following aspects. (1) How to speed up the convergence rate of PRESTIGE
by Nesterov’s accelerated strategy [44] or iterative machine teaching [55]. (2) To
achieve the optimal robustness of PRESTIGE on each dataset, how to adaptively
choose the ratio between εr and εs. (3) How to extend PRESTIGE to deep
learning (Appendix F). With these extensions, PRESTIGE can be applied to
more situations.
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